{
  "schema": "cain-universal-proof-manifest/1.0",
  "generated_at": "2026-09-18T04:22:00Z",
  "purpose": "Machine-readable index of CAIN 41.0 (Universal Agent Proof Network) evidence. Additive to /.well-known/cain-evidence.json, /.well-known/cain-economy.json, /.well-known/cain-agent-internet.json, /.well-known/cain-organizations.json.",
  "what_is_implemented_and_verified_this_session": {
    "universal_agent_proof": "REAL, TEST-VERIFIED (13/13 new tests) + ONE LIVE DEMO -- composes evidence references from independent CAIN subsystems (proof_type/chain_file/evidence_id/cluster_id/content_hash) into one signed object with its own freshness (issued_at/expires_at) and revocation.",
    "cross_subsystem_tamper_isolation": "REAL, PROVEN NOT JUST CLAIMED -- verify_universal_proof() returns a per-sub-proof verdict; a tampered economic chain and a clean organization chain referenced by the same proof are reported distinctly, tested and demonstrated live in the published bundle's negative control.",
    "independent_verifier_4_0_hardening": "REAL -- rejects algorithm confusion (alg=none-style downgrade), truncated/missing-field proofs, unsigned proofs, forged signatures, tampered post-signing fields, expired proofs, and cross-chain evidence splicing (an evidence_id from one cluster/organization claimed to belong to a different one).",
    "revocation_as_authenticated_event": "REAL -- revoking a proof changes its signed content (the revoked flag and reason are part of what's signed), so a revocation must be RE-SIGNED by an authority to be verifiable; a stale pre-revocation signature on now-revoked content is correctly rejected as SIGNATURE_INVALID, not silently accepted."
  },
  "self_caught_bug_this_session": "The first version of verify_sub_proof_membership() compared a chain record's own STORED content_hash field against the proof's claim, rather than independently recomputing the hash from the raw evidence fields -- meaning a tamper that changed an evidence field without also updating the stored hash string would have gone undetected. Caught by this session's own tamper-isolation test before publishing, fixed to recompute independently (reusing cain_37_independent_verifier's existing content-hash function). Documented here rather than silently corrected and forgotten.",
  "what_is_not_implemented": [
    "MCP/A2A/ARD live trust-evaluation integration",
    "agent swarm Byzantine attacks at any scale (10-10,000+ virtual agents)",
    "supply-chain SBOM / build-provenance attestation",
    "digital twin, 1,000,000-scenario adversarial campaign",
    "public transparency log (append-only, tamper-evident release ledger)",
    "full CAIN42 architecture/convergence documents beyond a short planning update"
  ],
  "evidence_bundle": "/proof/bundle/cain41-universal-proof-network/index.json",
  "read_only_api": {
    "proof_by_id": "/api/v1/universal-proof/{proof_id}",
    "proof_verify_by_id": "/api/v1/universal-proof/{proof_id}/verify",
    "public_submit_and_verify": "POST /api/v1/universal-proof/verify -- accepts an externally-submitted proof object and independently verifies it; never returns VALID merely because the submitter claims it"
  },
  "related_manifests": ["/.well-known/cain-evidence.json", "/.well-known/cain-economy.json", "/.well-known/cain-agent-internet.json", "/.well-known/cain-organizations.json"]
}
